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Recent Developments 
Baynor v. State 
Maryland Rule 4-263 Requires the State to Produce Relevant Information 
Regarding the Acquisition of Statements Made During a Custodial Interrogation 
that the State Intends to Use at Trial 
T he Court of Appeals of Mary land held that 
Maryland Rule 4-263(a)(2)(B) 
requires the state to disclose relevant 
information regarding the acquisition 
ofinclupatory statements made during 
a custodial interrogation. Baynor v. 
State, 355 Md. 726, 736 A.2d 325 
(1999). The court held that the State 
was not required to produce 
information regarding the 
circumstances of an entire one hour 
and fifty-three minute interrogation, 
where only a nine minute taped 
confession was introduced at trial. 
Rather, the prosecutor was only 
compelled to disclose relevant 
information regarding the acquisition 
of the inculpatory statement the State 
intended to use at trial. 
On September 26, 1996, Gary 
Baynor ("Baynor") was arrested and 
charged with murder and other related 
offenses. At police headquarters, 
Baynor was interviewed by Detective 
Michael Glenn and Detective Wayne 
Jones of the Homicide Unit. Baynor 
asked the detectives why he was 
brought to the unit, and Detective 
Glenn indicated that he was charged 
withmurder. Baynorthen asked what 
punishment he could receive and 
Detective Glenn stated he could 
receive life imprisonment or the death 
penalty. At the suppression hearing 
the detective testified inconsistently 
regarding his statement to Baynor. He 
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first testified that he told Baynor he 
could "be put to death summarily or 
life." He later testified, however, that 
he told Baynor, "he could receive life 
or the death penalty." Baynor 
subsequently agreed to answer the 
detectives' questions without a lawyer 
present. Although the interrogation 
started at 1 :28 p.m. and ended at 3 :21 
p.m. the detectives did not begin 
recording the interrogation until 3 : 12 
p.m. In the recorded portion ofthe 
interrogation, Baynor admitted to the 
shooting and was subsequently 
indicted. 
Baynor was convicted of second 
degree murder, attempted second 
degree murder, and other related 
offenses by a jury in the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City, and was sentenced 
to one hundred years incarceration. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed Baynor's 
conviction. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted the petition for writ 
of certiorari. 
The court began its analysis by 
addressing the issue of whether, under 
Maryland Rule 4-263, the State is 
required to produce the complete . 
details of an interrogation, including 
exculpatory statements made by the 
defendant. Baynor, 355 Md at 735, 
736 A.2d at 329-30. Maryland Rule 
4-263 states, in pertinent part, that the 
"State's Attorney shall furnish to the 
defendant: ... (2) Any relevant 
material or information regarding: .. 
. (B) the acquisition of statements 
made by the defendant to a State 
agent that the State intends to use at 
a hearing or trial .... " Id. at 735, 
736 A.2d at 330. 
The court recognized that the 
statement the prosecutor intended to 
use at the hearing or trial was the 
recorded portion of the interrogation 
that contained Baynor' s confession. 
Id. at 736, 736 A.2d at 330. The 
State had no intention of admitting the 
exculpatory statements made by 
Baynor prior to his confession. Id. 
at 737, 736A.2d at 330. Moreover, 
the court stated that the recorded 
portion of the interrogation disclosed 
the information that was required 
under Rule 4-263 (a)(2)(B), because 
the tape disclosed the time and place 
that the statements were made, the 
persons present during the 
interrogation, and Baynor's waiver of 
rights. Id. at 737, 736 A.2d at 331. 
As a result, the court held that 
information regarding Baynor's 
exculpatory statements "simply 
would not be relevant to the 
statements that the State actually 
intended to use." Id. 
Defense counsel argued that 
the State should disclose the 
circumstances of the complete 
interrogation, so as to allow the trier 
of fact to consider the totality of the 
circumstances when determining 
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voluntariness of a confession. Id The 
court stated that Rule 4-263 (a)(2)(B) 
did not intend to place such a 
responsibility on the State. Id. 
Furthermore, the State was not 
required to "disclose essentially a 
verbatim account of a custodial 
interrogation that ultimately results in 
an oral inculpatory statement." Id. 
The court concluded that the State did 
not violate Rule 4-263 by not 
disclosing a complete account of the 
custodial interrogation. Id at 740, 736 
A.2dat 332. 
The court also rejected the 
argument that all interrogations must 
be tape recorded to determine 
whether the interrogation was 
voluntary under a totality of the 
circumstances. Id at 738, 736 A.2d 
at 331. The court pointed out that a 
majority of other jurisdictions do not 
require that a custodial interrogation 
be tape recorded in order for a 
confession to be voluntary. Id. The 
court reasoned that the creation of a 
rule requiring that all interrogations be 
recorded is best left in the hands of 
the legislature. Id at 740, 736 A.2d 
at 332. 
The court next addressed the 
issue of whether the trial court 
restricted defense counsel's cross 
examination of the detectives during 
the pretrial hearing and trial, thereby 
barring him from eliciting evidence of 
the entire custodial interrogation. Id 
at 740, 736 A.2d at 332-33. The 
court noted that Baynortestified at the 
pretrial suppression hearing, and was 
questioned by defense counsel 
regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation. Id at 
740, 736 A.2d at 333. Therefore, 
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Baynor could have testified at trial 
regarding the details of the custodial 
interrogation. Id He chose, however, 
not to testify. Id 
The court also stated that 
defense counsel's examination of the 
detectives during the pretrial hearing 
and trial adequately disclosed 
evidence regarding the complete 
interrogation. Id at 741,736 A.2d 
at 333. This evidence consisted of, 
inter alia, Detective Glenn's 
statement to Baynor that he could 
receive the death penalty, the fact that 
only nine minutes out of the entire 
custodial interrogation were recorded, 
and testimony that Detective Glenn's 
notes of the interrogation did not 
contain all ofBaynor's statements. Id 
The court of appeals concluded 
that the trial court did not limit defense 
counsel's examination of the 
detectives. Id at 749, 736 A.2d at 
337. Defense counsel presented to 
the court and jury, testimony regarding 
the details of the recorded portion of 
the custodial interrogation. Id at 741, 
736 A.2d at 333. The court 
concluded that the evidence elicited 
by defense counsel was sufficient for 
the court and jury to consider the 
totality of the circumstances in 
determining the voluntariness of the 
confession. Id 
As a result of the holding in 
Baynor, the State has no duty to 
disclose the complete account of a 
custodial interrogation that results in 
an inculpatory statement. By strictly 
construing Rule 4-263 to require the 
State to only disclose relevant 
information regarding the portion of 
the defendant's statement that the 
State intends to use at trial, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has made 
access to information relating to the 
entire custodial interrogation more 
difficult to obtain. More importantly, 
State agents can continue to 
interrogate defendants for extended 
periods of time while only tape 
recording inculpatory statements 
made by the defendant. 
